




# Static Analysis II


CSCI2340: Software Engineering of Large Systems

Steven P. Reiss




# Type Checking Requires Work


- Type checking doesn't take flow of control into account
  - Considers the declared type, not the actual types
    - Routine without a declaration can return NULL, even if it wouldn't
    - Doesn't know what actual types might occur at a given point
  - Methods use their declared type, not what is effectively passed in
  - Need to annotate all intermediate methods and local declarations to make it work
    - And there can be a lot of them
- Want to understand the actual types occurring in execution
  - And the actual subtypes
  - More precise than the declared types
  - This provides more accurate analysis
  - With many fewer annotations
- Also want to track program states
  - Properties that aren't data-specific
  - More general safety conditions



# Beyond Type Checking



- Check data-oriented properties without all the annotations
  - Annotate only source and sink
- Check program-oriented properties
  - That aren't related to a type
- Approaches exist
  - Using **Data Flow Analysis** to propagate the properties
    - Running a model of the program with symbolic values
  - Using **Model Checking** to validate a safety property
    - Map program to an automata to a temporal logic predicate showing next state
    - Map safety condition to an automata to a temporal logic formula
    - Create a formula that says the program can enter an error state
    - Prove that formula is correct
  - Specialized approaches for specific properties (e.g., thread safety) also exist



# Data Flow Analysis: A More General Solution


- **Determines what code can be reached**
  - And what code orderings are possible
  - Considers different calling situations
- **Determines what values that can reach each point**
  - Value is an abstract representation of program data
    - Specific type & subtype and finite value representation
  - Tracked for all instances: stack, local variables, fields, globals
  - Values can then represent types (since they are typed)
    - Actual types, not declared types
- **Does implicit type checking**
  - Without having to specify the intermediate constraints





# Data Flow Analysis

- Can be used to check state-based safety conditions
  - Associate set of safety condition states with each program point
  - Propagate these through the execution
    - Changing states based on potential program events
  - Any point with an associated error state represents a potential error
- Can be used to check data-based safety conditions
  - Associate data states (subtypes) with each data element
    - Extend the notion of type to include base type plus subtypes
  - Propagate these through the execution
    - Computing and adjusting types and subtypes appropriately
  - Determine when data is used in an incorrect manner – subtypes conflict
- Can be used for more sophisticated checks
  - Tracking integer values (constraints), string lengths and contents
  - Check for buffer overflows, possible exceptions, invalid URLs and regular expressions, ...
- Still limited
  - It is an approximation – program and values are modeled, not exact
  - Checking for null violations is still difficult
  - Doesn't handle thread interleaving or locking (but handles threading)



# Sensitivity Levels of Data Flow Analysis

- Path-sensitive
  - Consider each different program path separately
    - First time through a loop versus 2<sup>nd</sup> time, ...
  - More accurate, but can get very expensive (recall path coverage)
- Flow-sensitive
  - Consider control flow within a method
  - But merge states when control flow comes together
- Flow-insensitive
  - Just look at all possible computations done in the method
    - In any order and without considering conditions, etc.
    - Much less expensive
  - Useful for some analyses
  - Too imprecise for safety condition checking
- Context-sensitive
  - Consider different call sites for methods as different methods
  - Otherwise merge inputs to a method; pass merged outputs back to each call site
  - Can also have partial context sensitivity

### Analysis Sensitivity




- **Flow-insensitive**
  - What *may* happen (on at least one path)
  - Linear-time
- **Flow-sensitive**
  - Consider control flow (what *must* happen)
  - Iterative data-flow: possibly exponential
- **Context-insensitive**
  - Call treated the same regardless of caller
  - “Monovariant” analysis
- **Context-sensitive**
  - Reanalyze callee for each caller
  - “Polyvariant” analysis
- **Path-sensitive vs. path-insensitive**
  - Computes one answer for every execution path
  - Subsumes flow-sensitivity
  - Extremely expensive

More sensitivity  
→ More accuracy, but more expensive

“Advanced Compiler Techniques” 22


# Precision & Accuracy

- A flow analysis is precise if
  - Every possible execution is included in the flow analysis
  - The analysis covers all executions and then some
- A precise analysis guarantees
  - If it shows there is no problem, the program is safe
  - If it shows a problem, the program MAY not be safe
- A flow analysis is accurate if
  - An error found in the analysis indicates an error in the program
  - But no errors in the analysis does not indicate the program is safe
  - Much more difficult to achieve, much less useful
- You want both accuracy and precision
  - Precision is probably more important
  - But there are tradeoffs between them
  - And both tradeoff with efficiency



# Compiler Data Flow Analysis


- Data flow analysis is used for compiler optimization
  - For specific properties
    - What variables are alive (will be used) at a program point
    - What definitions reach a given program point
    - What expressions are available
    - What values are constants
  - Fix set of bits indicating yes or no
- Bit sets are propagated and computed over the flow graph
  - Over a graph of basic blocks and their connections
  - Using relatively simple Boolean formulas (union, intersection)
- Very efficient computation of information needed
  - In terms of both time and space
- But this doesn't help with types & subtypes & program properties





# Abstract Interpretation

- **Abstract interpretation** based flow analysis
  - Simulate program execution
  - Using a finite state version of the program
  - Starting at all possible starting points
    - Main programs; test cases; ...
- **Using abstract values rather than actual ones**
  - Abstract value: data type with subtypes, source, constraints, subvalues
  - Simplified (finite) versions of data as discussed in prior lecture
    - With type and subtype information
- Keeping track of program states for general safety properties




# Abstract Execution Uses a Finite Program

- **Calls are not call-return**
  - Each method/function has its own execution model
  - Call merges call arguments into parameter values for called model
  - Called models are handled independently
  - Return value of called routine used at call site
- **Conditionals can take multiple branches**
  - Based on what is known about values
  - Nondeterministic finite state automata
- **Associate values with each instruction**
  - Values are finite but are always increasing
  - Control flow meeting points merge values
  - Need to reevaluate instructions when values change
- **The result is effectively a finite state automata**
  - With a finite set of values, evaluation will terminate




# Execution and Sensitivity



- How to interpret code depends on flow sensitivity
  - Multiple instances of a function -> context sensitive
    - Generally, a separate instance for each call site
  - Single instance of a function -> context insensitive
  - Consider flow inside a function -> flow sensitive
    - Otherwise, assume all statements are executed in any order
    - Flow insensitive is useful for some analyses, not in general
  - Multiple instances of a statement -> path sensitive
- Note that all of these keep the process finite
  - And hence all ensure the analysis will terminate

# Program Points


- Abstract interpretation effectively executes the program
  - Looking at the effect of each instruction if assembler/byte code
  - Interpreting source code at the instruction level
    - This can be done using the abstract syntax tree
    - Think of an ordered AST **visitation** as program instructions
      - Enter a node
      - Return to a node after each individual child
    - Dotted AST node (Node plus location in the visitation)
- These are **program points**
  - Exact set determined by sensitivity
  - But the set is finite
- Associate values with each program point
  - Finite set of finite values






# Values in Flow Analysis

- **Typed Data: finite representations of data**
  - With type and subtype information
  - For numbers, can indicate a particular value, value set, range, range set, ANY
    - Kept to a small number of items for each value
  - For strings, a particular value, value set, length range, ANY
  - For objects, keep a set of entities representing possible objects
    - Each creation site (new for example) has its own entity (finite number of these)
    - Generic entity for unknown sources
    - Each entity can have field values (which are typed data)
    - And array entities can have indexed values (which are typed data)
  - ANY values let flow analysis consider all possible inputs
- **Each program point has a collection of possible values**
  - Values accessible at that point (local variables, stack)
  - Global values are kept globally but can be accessed at any program point
  - Can keep track of fields that are set locally and then accessed (not necessarily accurate)
  - Overall precision of the flow analysis depends on value representations
- **Need to define how values are changed by program operations**
  - This is the nitty-gritty of abstract interpretation




# Values Stored for Program Points

- **Start of a Method:**
  - Value of parameters
  - Return value (merged)
  - Avoid reinterpretation if no changes
- **Program point:**
  - Instruction, Dotted AST node
  - Contents of local variables, stack
  - (Contents of fields stored locally)
- **Objects:**
  - Contents of various fields
  - Contents of array elements (by index and globally)
- **Global:**
  - Contents of global (static) variables: single value




# Operations on Values


- Merging two values
  - This is the most common operation
  - Needed at all flow merge points
  - Needed for global & field assignments
  - Needed for merging call arguments
  - Needed for merging return values
- Based on operators in the language
  - Assignments
  - Integer operations
  - String operations
  - Stack operations
  - Accessors (field & index)
  - Casts (implicit and explicit)
- Individual methods might be special
  - Sanitize, MD5 hashing can change subtype states



# Practical Abstract Interpretation




- **Need an efficient representation of values**
  - Tradeoff between precision and performance
  - Since representation needs to be small and finite
- **Need an effective way of doing the interpretation**
  - Knowing when to create a new instance of a routine (context sensitive)
  - Minimizing the reinterpretation of states
    - If merge doesn't change values, then no need to reinterpret
  - Tradeoff between precision and performance
- **Need to handle the quirks of the language**
  - Exceptions, callbacks from system methods
  - Reflection, native methods
- **Need to make things efficient**
  - To make this practical






# Efficient Abstract Interpretation

- Use a work queue algorithm
  - Start with program starting points (main, tests, ...)
  - Create dummy code to execute tests, static initializers, ...
- Given a program point with its values
  - Determine the set of next possible program points
  - And the possible values there
    - Stack, local variables
- Merge values as appropriate
  - From original values saved for that program point
    - Or just use the new values if the point was never executed
  - If anything changes or a new point, queue that program point
  - Try to queue alternatives in a logical order to minimize reevaluation
- Continue until nothing changes
  - Everything is finite; values only grow; this is guaranteed to terminate



# Flow Analysis Errors

- **Detected error indicates a possible program error**
  - Conflict between expected and actual subtypes
    - Using annotations to define expected subtypes
  - Error program state reached
    - After some program state event-based transition
  - Can be wrong (like lint) since it is an approximation
    - The abstract execution might not be possible in the real program
  - Saved state information can provide program path leading to error
    - This is the counter-example we desire
    - It produces a graph of possible counter-examples
    - User can go through and determine which if any of these is really possible
- **No errors found show the program is safe**
  - Assuming the analysis is accurate
  - But false positives can be reasonably common (depends on property)
- **Accuracy**
  - Lack of accuracy can yield false negatives (safe when program isn't)
  - One tries to avoid inaccuracy for safety conditions
  - But a little inaccuracy is probably okay for immediate feedback




# Abstract Interpretation Difficulties

- This sounds straightforward, **but**:
  - Real programming languages and real programs are not that simple
  - Need to handle real programs and their complications
- Java: handling reflection, native methods, initializations, etc.
- Handling call backs from system routines
  - Swing/AWT event loop itself is hidden
- Handling exceptions (especially run time exceptions)
  - Thrown exceptions are relatively easy
  - Considering all potential run time exceptions is expensive & not very helpful
- Handling test cases (in addition to the main program)
  - With the various @Before ... annotations
- Handling implicit calls
  - Static initializers, boxing and unboxing, lambdas
  - Calls to Thread.start imply invoking Thread.run()
- Tracking program state & subtype changes
- Making it efficient enough to work as the user types



# Flow Analysis Tools


- Quite a few exist
  - Mainly for fixed sets of properties
    - Optimized for those properties
  - Generally, these run in batch mode
  - And can take hours or days to run on something complex
- Examples
  - Amandroid for android checking
  - Commercial tools (C++): covery, parasoft, understand, veracode, ...
  - Often run with major check-ins, before releases
- Our Goal: Immediate feedback on safety errors





# Immediate Feedback

- A lot of things are still done in batch
  - Compilation
  - Testing
  - Checker type checking
  - Checkstyle
  - Automatic bug repair
- I believe they would all be more effective if done immediately
  - Provide feedback as the developer types
  - Compiler feedback in today's IDEs shows this
- My research goal continues to be to find ways to achieve this
  - Continuous testing: not that useful since tests take too long and interact
  - ROSE for automatic bug repair while you debug
  - Code Bubbles checkstyle plugin to check as you edit
  - And abstract interpretation for checking safety properties as you edit
    - Fast data flow analysis has other applications as well



# Safety Checking as you Program

- **Goal: Show the state of safety conditions in real time**
  - As the programmer writes or edits the code
  - Show problems to the programmer in the IDE
- **This is the goal of our FAIT project**
  - Runs in conjunction with Code Bubbles
  - Provides error indications at safety violations
  - Provides information on why this is a safety violation
    - Graph of paths leading to the violation
  - Provides other information
    - Backwards slice of a variable
  - Useful for other tools
    - ROSE uses it to do fault localization

| SAFETY CHECK |      |
|--------------|------|
| BY           | DATE |
|              |      |


# FAIT: Efficient Flow Analysis in an IDE

- **Making it efficient and complete**
  - Handle all the Java complexities such as reflection with some user input (via a resource file)
  - Special handling collections, maps, string buffers
  - Ignoring methods that do not matter with respect to the condition(s)
    - Based on user input in a resource file
  - Using unique immutable objects for efficient entity and value representations
- **Making it concurrent**
  - For much faster flow analysis
  - Work queue of methods to work on; work queue of locations in the method
  - Separate threads can work on separate methods simultaneously with little synchronization
- **Making it incremental**
  - To update as the user types
  - Detect what might have changed, mark those as invalid, add to work queues
- **Handling both source and binary files simultaneously – parallel interpreters**
  - Source for files being edited (needed to avoid continual save and compile)
  - Binary for everything else
- **Tries to be both accurate and precise while being efficient**
  - User input on what is important; what values to consider; what should be context sensitive



# Code Bubbles FAIT Analyzer

- Runs as part of the environment
  - Updates anytime there are no compiler errors
    - Can't execute when there are errors
  - Provides immediate feedback
    - Typically, in under a second, with initial analysis in under a minute
- Requires the user to define subtypes and safety conditions
  - What they want to have checked
    - This varies from one system to another
    - Some basic ones predefined (Tainted data for SQL injection & XSS, for example)
  - Subtypes
    - Various states, rules for computation; again, some basic ones predefined
  - Safety conditions
    - Various states, program events, rules for changing state based on event




```
edu>brown>cs>securitylab>SecurityRequest>render(...)
/*
 * Rendering methods
 */
*****

Response render(String page, Map<String, Object> context)
{
    File f = new File(template_directory, page);
    if (!f.exists()) {
        f = new File(template_directory, page + ".html");
    }
    if (!f.exists()) {
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.NOT_FOUND,
            TEXT_MIME, "File not found");
    }
    try {
        String cnts = IvyFile.loadFile(f);
        String ren = doRender(cnts, context);
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.OK, HTML_MIME, ren);
    }
    catch (IOException e) {
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.NOT_FOUND,
            TEXT_MIME, "File not found");
    }
}
```



# FAIT in Code Bubbles

- Requires some annotation of the code
  - Using Java type annotations
    - Either direct or indirect (in resource file)
  - Using preannotated library routines (from resource file)
  - Source and sink annotations required for type checking
    - But not the intermediate values as Checker would require
    - Standard ones (e.g., Spring html server, Java html server) are predefined
    - Or can call dummy function (e.g., KarmaUtils.taint(data))
  - Calls to dummy function indicate state-based events
    - KarmaUtils.event("event")
- Requires additional information from a resource file
  - How to handle reflection, native methods
    - Reflection only in cases where the class is never instantiated otherwise
    - Most standard library native methods are taken care of
  - Note special case methods (e.g., those that never return)
  - What methods can be ignored (for better performance)
    - Or whole classes or whole packages
- Current Research on user interface to define and edit the resource file
  - This is a difficult user interface problem



# FAIT in Code Bubbles

| ? | Description                                             | Resource                   | Line |
|---|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------|
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityAllocations.java   | 55   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityRequest.java       | 181  |
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityProfile.java       | 66   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted SQL data in a non-tainted loc... | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted data in as a file name           | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityContributions.java | 62   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted data in as a file name           | SecurityProfile.java       | 109  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityProfile.java       | 109  |
| E | Unauthorized administrative access                      | SecurityBenefits.java      | 64   |

- Reasonably precise for most safety conditions
  - But this varies with complexity of the code
  - And how complex one allows values to become (ranges and constraints)
  - Doesn't detect multithreading errors (e.g., deadlocks and race conditions)
    - Doesn't consider locks in general
  - Graphs let user explore output; resource files let user adjust program to achieve more precision
- Mostly accurate, but accuracy not guaranteed
  - Performance, reflection annotations, native code
    - User descriptions of these in resource files might introduce errors
  - Doesn't consider all possible run time exceptions
- Fast enough to be useful
  - Updates whenever code is error free
  - Presents current errors to user
  - Can be queried in real time
    - Provide a back slice of how a value might be set from the editor
    - Provide information to ROSE on possible locations leading to a fault
    - Provide a trace of how an error might have occurred

# FAIT in Code Bubbles

Explain: Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted location  
In Method : edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityRequest.render  
At Line : 181

- edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityRequest.render
  - 181: Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted location
    - 181: Variable context referenced
  - 168: Start of Method render
- edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityAccount.handleLoginRequest
  - 163: Call to Method render

Show Code Create Test Case

| ? | Description                                             | Resource                   | Line |
|---|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------|
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityAllocations.java   | 55   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityRequest.java       | 181  |
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityProfile.java       | 66   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted SQL data in a non-tainted loc... | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted data in as a file name           | SecurityAccount.java       | 146  |
| E | Unauthorized user access                                | SecurityContributions.java | 62   |
| E | Attempt to use tainted data in as a file name           | SecurityProfile.java       | 109  |
| E | Attempt to use tainted HTML data in a non-tainted l...  | SecurityProfile.java       | 109  |
| E | Unauthorized administrative access                      | SecurityBenefits.java      | 64   |

FAIT Resource Editor for javasecurity

| Subtypes                               | Safety Conditions | Reflection | Performance |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|
| edu.brown                              | 24518             | 13         | 378         |
| edu.brown.cs                           | 24518             | 13         | 378         |
| edu.brown.cs.securitylab               | 24518             | 13         | 378         |
| edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityDatab | 9919              | 5          | 129         |
| edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityReque | 9491              | 5          | 91          |
| edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityAccou | 1767              | 0          | 37          |
| edu.brown.cs.securitylab.SecurityWebS  | 1201              | 0          | 65          |

Revert Save Done

```
edu>brown>cs>securitylab>SecurityAllocations>displayAllocations(...)
/*
 *
 * Handle displaying allocations
 *
 */
*****

Response displayAllocations(SecurityRequest req)
{
    assert KarmaEvent("CheckUserRole");

    String userid = req.get("forUser");
    String threshold = req.get("threshold");

    String q = "SELECT * FROM Allocations WHERE userid = ?";
    if (threshold != null) {
        int thint = Integer.parseInt(threshold);
        if (thint >= 0 && thint <= 99) {
            q += " AND stocks > " + thint;
        }
    }

    List<Map<String, Object>> rs = use_database.query(q, userid);
    if (rs.size() > 0) {
        Map<String, Object> scopes = rs.get(0);
        return req.render("allocations", scopes);
    }


    return req.renderError("No allocations available");
}
```

```
edu>brown>cs>securitylab>SecurityRequest>render(...)
/*
 *
 * Rendering methods
 *
 */
*****

Response render(String page, Map<String, Object> context)
{
    File f = new File(template_directory, page);
    if (!f.exists()) {
        f = new File(template_directory, page + ".html");
    }
    if (!f.exists()) {
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.NOT_FOUND,
            TEXT_HTML, "File not found");
    }
    try {
        String cnts = IvyFile.loadFile(f);
        String ren = doRender(cnts, context);
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.OK, HTML_HTML, ren);
    }
    catch (IOException e) {
        return NanoHTTPD.newFixedLengthResponse(Response.Status.NOT_FOUND,
            TEXT_HTML, "File not found");
    }
}
```


# Model Checking

- **Abstract interpretation is limited**
  - Doesn't consider interleaving executions
  - Doesn't consider external events
  - Doesn't consider locking
  - Doesn't consider the external world
- **Model Checking is a more general approach**
  - Designed to handle interactions with the external world
  - Designed to handle thread-based interleaving
  - Can handle locking
  - Used extensively for embedded systems






# Model Checking



- Originally created for checking hardware
  - Small number of internal states
  - Hardware is inherently finite
- Then used for checking embedded systems
  - Embedded code is usually relatively simple
    - And usually modeled or written as a finite state automata
  - Interactions with the real world are important
  - These are often safety-critical (e.g., pinball fuses; train crashes)
- Then use to check arbitrary software systems
  - Checking individual safety conditions in a program


# Model Checking




- Can be done in terms of automata
  - One automata for program, one for safety condition
  - Find all possible pairs of states
    - Run the two automata in step (cross-product)
    - Events from program automata drive condition automata
    - Outside events can also change the condition automata
  - This is effectively what is done by abstract interpretation state checking
- Usually done in terms of temporal logic formulas
  - Boolean formulas
  - With additional operators for time (different sets are used)
    - X is true forever (X always occurs)
    - X is true in the next state
    - X is true in some future state (X eventually occurs)
    - X is true in some state after Y is true

# Model Checking

- Create a single formula that is true if the program fails
  - Represent a program state  $s$  as a Boolean vector
    - Finite number of variables, each with a finite representation
    - Includes the program counter (e.g., the program point)
    - Assume a finite number of threads – each thread has its own state
      - Program state is the concatenation of the thread states
  - Define the starting state of the program  $s_0$
  - Create a logical relation representing program execution
    - $R(s_1, s_2)$  is true if program can transition from state  $s_1$  to state  $s_2$
    - Basically,  $R$  is the OR of the effect of each instruction on the program state
  - Create a temporal logic formula representing the condition  $C(s_1)$ 
    - Over the program state – map from the FSA if needed
  - Create a formula that says an execution from  $s_0$  leads a state where  $C$  holds
    - Temporal logic (repeatedly use program relation)
  - This is large, but can be created mechanically
- Prove that formula holds
  - The proof provides a counter example and hence a potentially buggy execution
  - Find a set of values that satisfies this formula
  - Convert that into the appropriate execution



# Model Checking



- Various technique exist to do the checking efficiently
  - Ordered binary decision diagrams
    - Cute data structure that can greatly simplify the search
    - Can handle program states space of size  $2^{100}$  or so
  - Newer technologies for 3SAT and similar problems
    - Can generally handle these as well
  - These are all batch processes however
- Both can yield a proof that shows how the program can fail
  - Which can be translated into a counterexample
  - Which can be translated back to the actual program
  - To provide feedback to the user



# Practical Model Checking

- The whole process can be semi-automated
- **JavaPathFinder is used by NASA for example**
  - Starts with annotated Java code
  - And conditions to check
- **Either says the model is correct**
  - Or shows an execution leading to an error
    - Counterexample
  - If the reported execution isn't possible
    - The model can be made more robust
    - Adding additional annotations or constraints
    - Extending the way values or the program is modeled
  - Often, a proof involves multiple such changes



National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration

Intelligent Systems Division  
NASA Ames Research Center

## Program Model Checking

### A Practitioner's Guide

Masoud Mansouri-Samani, *Perot Systems Government Services*  
Peter C. Mehlitz, *Perot Systems Government Services*  
Corina S. Pasareanu, *Perot Systems Government Services*  
John J. Penix, *Google, Inc.*  
Guillaume P. Brat, *USRA/RIACS*  
Lawrence Z. Markosian, *Perot Systems Government Services*  
Owen O'Malley, *Yahoo, Inc.*  
Thomas T. Pressburger, *NASA Ames Research Center*  
Willem C. Visser, *Seven Networks, Inc.*

January 15, 2008  
Version 1.1

# PROJECT

- You should have a working version of your project
  - Not fully functional
  - But demonstratable
  - Something you can feel good about
- Choose a date for project presentations
  - One of 12/3, 12/5, 12/10 (2 presentations a day)
  - Or I will choose one for you
  - eMail me your options and priorities and I will assign dates